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STOUT v. NETHERLAND
1996 WL 496601 (4th Cir. 1996)1
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
In February 1987, Larry Allen Stout entered a dry-cleaning store,
owned and operated by Jacqueline Kooshian. According to the
Commonwealth's evidence, Stout told Kooshian he was there to pick up
some clothing. Kooshian turned toward the racks of clothing when Stout
approached her from behind and slashed her throat. Kooshian, who
subsequently ran out of the store, died before reaching the hospital.
2
Stout pleaded guilty to the capital murder of Kooshian and the
robbery. The trial court accepted Stout's plea and proceeded directly to
the sentencing phase. At this stage, the Commonwealth introduced
evidence of three unadjudicated robberies and hearsay testimony about
a previous murder. In mitigation, defense counsel called two witnesses:
a chief correctional officer and Stout's former cellmate who testified that
Stout was almost entirely illiterate. Several months later, the sentencing
hearing reconvened and the court considered a presentence report. The
report described Stout's childhood, portraying him as an uneducated
mixed-blood migrant worker whose alcoholic parents subjected him to
both physical and sexual abuse. Defense counsel elected not to introduce
a psychological report that, in addition to detailing his background and
abuse, diagnosed Stout as suffering from antisocial personality disorder.
Instead, counsel introduced a letter from Stout's mother describing her
son's hard life. At the conclusion of the sentencing phase, the trial court
sentenced Stout to death for capital murder, finding both "future danger-
ousness" and that the murder was vile.
3
After he was denied relief on direct appeal and in state habeas, Stout
filed a federal habeas petition in 1991. He raised twelve claims concern-
ing the voluntary nature of his guilty plea and the effectiveness of his trial
counsel. The district court held that Stout's claims alleging an involun-
tary guilty plea were procedurally defaulted and remanded the remaining
claims to a magistrate judge for evidentiary hearings. At these hearings,
Stout presented evidence suggesting that his trial counsel failed to
present mitigating evidence and that Stout did not understand "premedi-
tation" when he entered his guilty plea. In addition, a law enforcement
officer stated that the victim's throat wound supported Stout's descrip-
tion of the murder as an "impulsive act" and not a premeditated one.4 The
magistrate judge recommended that Stout's petition be denied. The
district court accepted most of the magistrate's recommendations, but
held that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise Stout about
entering a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford5 and in failing to
present mitigating evidence. 6 The district court vacated Stout's guilty
plea, allowing him sixty days to enter another plea.
7
I This case is an unpublished opinion referenced in "Table of
Decisions Without Report Opinions," 95 F.3d 42, (1996)
2 Stout v. Netherland, 1996 WL 496601, at * 1 (4th Cir. 1996).
3 Id. at *1-4.
4 Id. at *5. At the sentencing phase, Stout testified that the victim
was cut in a physical struggle with Stout.
5 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (providing that a defendant may plead guilty
without admitting all elements of the crime charged).
6 Stout, 1996 WL 496601, at *6.
71d.
8 Id. at *7.
9 Id. at * 12. In its opinion, the court of appeals did not consider the
The Commonwealth appealed, claiming that a procedural bar
prevented the district court from considering Stout's claim regarding a
possibleAlford plea and challenging the district court's finding that trial
counsel was ineffective during the sentencing phase. Stout cross-ap-
pealed and challenged the district court's finding that he had procedurally
defaulted eight of his claims.
8
HOLDING
The court of appeals held that Stout did not receive ineffective
assistance of counsel during the guilt and sentencing phases of his trial
and reversed the district court. In addition, the court rejected Stout's
cross-appeal and upheld the district court's finding that his claims were
procedurally barred.9
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
On appeal, the Commonwealth challenged two of the district
court's findings that Stout received ineffective assistance of counsel
during the entry of his guilty plea and during the sentencing proceedings.
Specifically, the Commonwealth claimed that the district court could not
consider a claim of ineffective assistance for trial counsel's failure to
advise Stout about anAlford plea because such a claim was procedurally
barred. In addition, the Commonwealth contested the district court's
finding that trial counsel was ineffective in presenting mitigation evi-
dence. 10 The court of appeals evaluated the Commonwealth's claims
under the standard established in Strickland v. Washington. 1
A. Failure to Advise Defendant of an Alford Plea Option
The district court found Stout's trial counsel had been ineffective in
failing to advise Stout about entering an Alford claim. 12 Under North
Carolina v. Alford,13 a defendant may enter a plea of guilty without
admitting all of the elements of the crime. The district court noted that an
Alford plea would have allowed Stout to deny the element of premedita-
tion. Entering such a plea, the district court found, would have made
Stout's later contention of not premeditating the murder more credible.
The court held that trial counsel's failure to explain the possibility of an
Alfordplea created a prejudicial strategic disadvantage.14 On appeal, the
Commonwealth argued that a procedural bar prevented the district court
prosecutor's obligation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),
and Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct 1555 (1995), to disclose exculpatory
evidence concerning unadjudicated acts. If Stout's sentencing trial oc-
curred after the enactment of 19.2-264.3:2 in 1993, he would have been
entitled to notice of the Commonwealth's intent to rely on unadjudicated
acts during the sentencing.
10 Stout, 1996 WL 496601, at *7.
11 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
12 Stout, 1996 WL at *8.
13 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
14 Stout, 1996 WL at *8.
Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 - Page 23
from even considering this issue. 15 The court of appeals did not address
the effect of a procedural bar, but instead disagreed with district court on
the merits.
The court of appeals found that the evidence of Stout's premedita-
tion was so "overwhelming" that the entry of an Alford plea would not
have bolstered the defendant's credibility.16 The court speculated that
such a plea might even have shown a lack of remorse. 17 Given the
possible disadvantages of entering anAlfordplea, thecourt found that the
recommendation of an unconditional plea was a strategic choice. The
court of appeals held that this strategic decision deserved the deference
afforded to counsel under Strickland, and did not fall outside the bounds
of professional competence 18
The court of appeals also rejected the district court's conclusion that
failure to investigate the possibility of an Alford claim resulted in the
guilty plea being involuntary and unknowing. Lack of premeditation, the
district court held, was a "weak defense" at best. 19 The court of appeals
found that, given the unlikelihood of success with this defense, trial
counsel was under no obligation to further investigate the possible plea.
The court further concluded that the low likelihood of success meant any
failure to suggest an Alford plea did not subject Stout to prejudice from
which he could seek relief.
20
Stout claimed that the district court's finding of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel was not based solely on trial counsel's failure to
recommend an Alford plea.21 Yet, the court of appeals only considered
the impropriety of not giving advice about an Alford plea, not counsel's
performance in general. If Stout's characterization of the court's holding
is accurate, a question of fairness exists. The court of appeals' analysis
of the ineffective assistance issue would be too narrowly focused on trial
counsel's failure to advise about an Alford plea. When entering a guilty
plea to a charge of capital murder, counsel's assistance is of paramount
importance. 22 If Stout's counsel was ineffective when he entered a plea,
a narrow focus away from trial counsel's general competency may have
denied Stout relief to which he was entitled.
The court of appeals' reasoning about the existence of a strategic
choice is likewise questionable. The court engaged in its own rank
speculation about the effect of an Alford plea and then credited defense
counsel with recognition of this risk, christening it a "reasonable strate-
gic choice."23 The court of appeals did not reference any testimony to
evidence a strategic decision by defense counsel. Rather, it assumed one
to exist from the circumstances of the case. It is equally likely, looking
only to the fact he counseled an unconditional plea, that trial counsel
simply didn't consider an Afford plea.
The choice to enter a guilty plea to capital murder must often be
made under extenuating circumstances. Nevertheless, the Virginia Capi-
tal Clearinghouse strongly recommends that defense counsel attempt to
dissuade their clients from entering such a plea unless the prosecution has
15 Id. Stout claimed that the district court, in finding ineffective
assistance of counsel, did not rely on his counsel's failure to advise him
of an Alford plea. Rather, the district court took note of the failure to
advise as an illustration that "trial counsel could have presented a
coherent strategy throughout the case." The Commonwealth claimed
that the district court's finding of ineffective assistance was based
entirely upon counsel's not advising of an Alford plea. The court of
appeals considered the issue as the Commonwealth presented it, and did
not address counsel's performance in general with respect to the plea.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Stout, 1996 WL 496601, at *9.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id at *8. See infra at n. 14.
agreed in writing not to pursue a death sentence or the court has indicated
formally or informally that it will not sentence the client to death. A guilty
plea admits every element of a crime and waives most appellate issues.24
B. Failure to Present Mitigation Evidence
The Commonwealth challenged the district court's finding that trial
counsel was ineffective in presenting "virtually no case in mitigation." 25
Given the abundance of mitigating circumstances in the defendant's life,
the district court held that trial counsel's approach was not attributable
to a plausible strategic judgment, finding his investigation "minimal. ' 2
6
In his response to the Commonwealth's appeal, Stout argued that
counsel was ineffective for failing to present a psychological report. The
court reviewed this issue under Bunch v. Thompson.2 7 In Bunch, trial
counsel elected not to introduce a psychiatrist's testimony, despite the
presence of beneficial mitigating evidence, because counsel feared the
reinforcement of the defendant's self-destructive behavior in the minds
of the jury.28 The court of appeals characterized Bunch as holding that
"provided there is a conceivable strategic advantage to the decision not
to introduce certain evidence in mitigation, that choice is virtually
unassailable on collateral review." 29
Under this standard, the court evaluated Stout's trial counsel's
decision to omit a psychological report during the sentencing phase. This
report contained a great deal of useful evidence for presenting a case in
mitigation such as Stout's troubled childhood as a mix-raced, migrant
farm worker who suffered both physical and sexual assaults at the hands
of his alcoholic parents. The report also contained the psychologist's
conclusion that Stout suffered from an antisocial personality disorder
and was likely to commit violent acts in the future. Trial counsel testified
that he made a strategic decision not to introduce this evidence, given the
report's conclusion. Furthermore, counsel stated that he had made
attempts to contact the sources of information listed in the report. The
court of appeals accepted trial counsel's testimony and found that the
report sufficiently informed counsel of the defendant's background such
that further investigation was not necessary. Accordingly, the court held
that counsel's decision to not introduce the psychological report could
not support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel underBunch. 3 0
As seen in Stout's case, defense counsel often face the double-
edged sword of a collection of mitigating evidence that contains poten-
tially damaging elements. This situation often arises in the reports and
testimony of professional examiners. These reports can illustrate the
defendant's troubled life, but often reach a conclusion that weakens the
case in mitigation. For instance, although Stout's examiner found a
history of abuse, that examiner concluded Stout had an antisocial
personality disorder. To avoid such a problem, defense counsel might
22 In McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1969), the United
States Supreme Court made the definitive holding that the right to
counsel guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel during
entry of a guilty plea. Id. at 770-71.
23 Stout, 1996 WL at *8.
24 See Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 126, 132 (1989) (holding
Stout's guilty plea made assignments of error concerning sentencing not
cognizable on appeal).
25 Stout, 1996 WL at *9.
26 Id.
27 949 F.2d 1354 (4th Cir. 1991).
28 Id. at 1364.
29 Stout, 1996 WL 496601, at *10 (emphasis added).
301d. at 11.
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stress to the experts they have obtained under Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.3:1 the minimal requirements for written reports prepared pursuant
to that statute.3 1 Further, the presentation of life history evidence through
lay witnesses is essential, whether done in order to communicate the
underlying basis for an expert's opinion or standing alone. It is not
necessary to choose between the mixed comments of a written report and
the testimony of witnesses.
Lay witnesses are often highly effective in communicating mitigat-
ing evidence to the jury.32 They can provide first hand accounts of the
hardships the defendant faced and/or his reactions to social stimuli. Lay
witnesses tell their observations, often through vivid anecdotes and
specific acts, in a manner that jurors easily understand and to which they
may relate. In doing so, lay witnesses can graphically illustrate how an
event, such as abuse, contributes to who the defendant was at the time of
the murder and who he is today. This "humanizing" of the defendant
combats a juror's understandable reaction to abstract evidence of abuse
and/or abandonment, which may be expressed as, "I was abused (orknow
someone who was) and I didn't commit murder."
An example illustrates this point. In California, a jury convicted a
defendant of a brutal double murder involving a great deal of disfigure-
ment of the victims. In mitigation, defense counsel introduced the
testimony of several of the defendant's sisters. The sisters told a story of
intense and horrific physical and emotional abuse. After returning a
recommendation for a life sentence, several jurors related one particular
story that shaped their understanding of who the defendant was. The
sisters described the defendant as having only two possessions as a child,
a dog and a rabbit, each of whom he cared for deeply. One day, drunk,
the father forced the son to watch as he broke the neck of the rabbit and
then attempted to force the dog to eat the rabbit. When the dog refused,
the father shot and killed the dog. This story helped the jurors to
meaningfully understand how the abuse the defendant suffered as a child
deeply affected him in later years.
33
Prosecutors face two difficulties in counteracting the effectiveness
of these witnesses. First, their stories are historical accounts and as such,
they are very difficult to contradict. Second, the witnesses are not
presenting any conclusions which the prosecutor can attack as he would
an expert's testimony. In general, prosecutors are less likely to subject
these individuals to effective cross-examination.
34
Furthermore, the use of lay witnesses as the primary vehicle for
introducing mitigation evidence allows trial counsel to orchestrate the
theme of mitigation, avoiding weak points. 35 Under this approach, the
defense presents the witnesses' testimony first and then uses an expert to
31 Va. Code Ann § 19.2-264.3:1 (C) requires that the expert's report
contain her opinion as to:
(i) whether the defendant acted under extreme mental or
emotional disturbance at the time of the offense, (ii) whether
the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of
this conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law was significantly impaired, and (iii) whether there are any
other factors in mitigation relating to the history or character
of the defendant or the defendant's mental condition at the time
of the offense.
See Collica, Alice in Wonderland Interpretations: Rethinking the Use of
Mental Mitigation Experts, Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 57
(1996).
32 See generally William S. Geimer, Law andReality in the Capital
Penalty Trial, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 273, 293 (1991).
33 This example comes from the research of Professor Scott
Sundby, who will soon publish an article discussing inter alia the
bind the testimony together and, hopefully, affirm a conclusion the jury
has already accepted. Experts are not always essential to the case in
mitigation. Many of the behavioral and psychological theories defen-
dants put forward are not complex and are easily understood. Certainly,
the problem presented by a report containing favorable and unfavorable
conclusions can be avoided without sacrificing the substance of a case in
mitigation.
Presenting a case in mitigation through lay-witnesses involves a
great deal of work in locating the witnesses and eliciting their testimony.
Yet, the correlation between difficulty and likelihood of success appears
to be strong.
II. Stout's Cross-Appeal
A. Claims must be "face-up and squarely" presented
The district court agreed with the magistrate's finding that Stout had
defaulted three claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel based
upon advising a guilty plea without first ensuring that death would not be
the sentence.36 The magistrate found that Stout "'did not assert [his
claims in state court], either directly or in language that can fairly be
interpreted as such' before filing ahabeas petition in federal court.3 7 On
appeal, Stout claimed he raised these claims in his pro se pleading on
direct appeal and in his state habeas petition. The court of appeals
disagreed and upheld the district court, stating, "[I]n order to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement, a habeas litigant must present his claims 'face-
up and squarely,' thus providing the state court with a 'full and fair
opportunity to consider them." 38 Finding that Stout had not adequately
presented his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court of
appeals held that Stout's claims were procedurally barred.
39
The court of appeals' holding suggests that a pleading requires more
than a simple statement of a claim to assure that claim will not be lost. The
opinion does not provide any detail as to what Stout alleged in his pro se
pleading. The opinion also does not describe with sufficient detail and
clarity the standard of "face-up and squarely." It is unclear what mini-
mum amount of detail a claim must have to assure that the defendant has
met the exhaustion requirement. Other recent opinions of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals suggest that defendants must present their
claims with a thoroughness reminiscent of code-pleading.40 The court's
holding on this issue underscores the need for every claim to be made
clearly on the record, restated in subsequent appeals, contain some
grounding as a federal issue, and be alleged both broadly and narrowly.
4 1
effective use of lay witnesses. See Scott Sundby, The Jury as Critic, 83
Va. L. Rev. __ (1997). Counsel with pending capital cases should contact
the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for a summary of Professor
Sundby's findings.
34 William S. Geimer, supra note 32, at 293.
35 The Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse suggests that defense
counsel remind the jury that mitigation is not an attempt to excuse the
underlying crime, but rather, a demonstration of why a life sentence is
appropriate in the defendant's case.
36 Stout, 1996 WL 496601, at *11.
37 Id.
381d. (citingMallory v. Smith, 27 F.3d 991,994-95 (4th. Cir. 1994)).
39 Id.
40 See case summaries of Beaver v. Thompson and Hoke v.
Netherland, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
41 See Cooper, The Never Ending Stoty: Combating Procedural
Bars in Capital Cases, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
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B. Claims that defective pleas must be made on direct
appeal
Stout challenged the district court's finding that two of his claims
regarding the validity of his plea were procedurally barred.42 The district
court held that under Slayton v. Parrigan,4 3 Stout had defaulted these
claims for subsequent habeas review by not raising them on direct appeal.
Stout argued that Slayton should not bar his claim because he could not
have raised it on direct appeal without a change of counsel. The court of
appeals disagreed and held that Stout could have presented a claim that
his plea was involuntary without a change of counsel.44 Relying on
James v. Kentucky,4 5 Stout also claimed the Slayton rule, because it is not
consistently applied by the Supreme Court of Virginia, could not be used
to bar his claim. The court of appeals, citing cases in which the Supreme
Court ofVirginia had followed the Slayton rule, disagreed and upheld the
district court's finding that Stout's claim was barred.
4 6
The court's analysis is technically correct. A claim of involuntary
plea is a due process claim alleging that the trial court erred in accepting
the plea. 47 This error does not speak directly to the conduct of defense
counsel. Yet, as a practical matter, the distinction between the issues of
an involuntary plea and ineffective assistance may be illusory. In many
situations, an attorney's failure to fully explain the options and ramifica-
tions of a guilty plea is the basis for a claim that the plea was involuntary.
If trial counsel also represents the defendant on direct appeal, there is no
incentive for her to raise issues surrounding her own competence, or lack
thereof, in ensuring that the plea she recommended was made voluntarily
and intelligently.
C. Guilty plea and claims of aggravating factors as overly
broad
The magistrate found that Stout had defaulted his claim that
Virginia's aggravating factors were overly broad and a second claim that
the trial court's finding of these factors was arbitrary and capricious. The
4 2 Stout, 1996 WL 496601, at* 12. Stout's claims were that the plea
of guilty was involuntary. See discussion of Stout's understanding of
"premeditation" and his illiteracy, supra.
43 215 Va. 27, 30, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974) (holding that
prisoner's constitutional claim may not be raised in habeas proceedings
when prisoner did not raise the question on appeal).
44 Stout, 1996 WL at *12.
45 466 U.S. 341,348-49 (1984) (holding that a state procedural bar
is not adequate unless the rule is firmly established and regularly
followed).
46 Stout, 1996 WL at *12.
47 Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-45 (1976) (holding
court's failure to provide sufficient explanation of offense's elements
made plea involuntary).
magistrate held that Stout's guilty plea and the rule in Hawks v. Cox48
barred him from raising his claims of overbreadth in federal court. The
magistrate also held that Stout's failure to raise his claim that the trial
court arbitrarily applied the aggravating factors on direct appeal pre-
vented him from bringing that claim in federal court. In his federal habeas
petition, Stout alleged that it was error for the district court to accept the
magistrate's findings. The court of appeals summarily dismissed Stout's
assignments of error and upheld the magistrate's findings. 49
Neither the guilty plea nor the Hawks rule should have barred
Stout's claims. A guilty plea waives complaints about the elements of
capital murder. It does not waive complaints about the aggravating
factors found in sentencing. The court of appeals provided no authority
for its assertion that a guilty plea waives a defendant's claims about the
application of aggravating factors, or any aspect of the capital sentenc-
ing scheme.
Relying on Hawks, the court of appeals held that "claims previously
determined are barred from consideration by a federal habeas court."
'50
This finding is puzzling in light of the court's opinion in Turner v.
Williams,51 in which the court stated that"Hawks cannot prevent federal
habeas review of federal constitutional claims properly raised on direct
appeal.' 52 The court of appeals' new interpretation of Hawks is unsup-
ported by further explanation and it is ultimately a mischaracterization of
the Hawks rule. Under Virginia procedure in effect during Stout's case,
prisoners filed their state habeas petitions in the state trial court. The
Hawks court expressed the common sense conclusion that the trial court
could not grant relief contrary to a ruling on the merits made by the
Supreme Court of Virginia on direct appeal. Likewise, Turner presented
another common sense conclusion that a federal claim, once presented
and rejected on the merits in state court, need not be presented twice to
avoid procedural bar. Unfortunately, Stout's execution mooted this issue
for the present.
Summary and Analysis by:
David T. McIndoe
48 211 Va. 91, 175 S.E.2d 271 (1970) (holding where all allegations
of state habeas petition had been resolved against petitioner by previous
adjudication, he was not entitled to further relief).
49 Stout, 1996 WL 496601, at *12.
50 Id. at *12.
5t 35 F.3d 872 (4th Cir. 1994).
5235 F.3d at 890. See also, Correll v. Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279,1289
n.8 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that Hawks does not bar federal habeas
review of claims that already may be properly considered by this court
through their presentation on direct appeal).
